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QUIETING THE VIRTUAL PRISON RIOT:
WHY THE INTERNET’S SPIRIT OF “SHARING”
MUST BE BROKEN
ALBERT Z. KOVACS
[I]t’s amazing what you can do when you don’t have to look at your-
self in the mirror anymore.
HOLLOW MAN1
To demand equality of rights . . . as the socialists of the subject caste
do, is never an emanation of justice but of greed. – If one holds up
bleeding chunks of meat to an animal and takes them away again
until it finally roars: do you think this roaring has anything to do
with justice?
Friedrich Nietzsche2
Thou shalt not steal.
Exodus 20:153
INTRODUCTION
The Internet has changed much about everyday life. The way
people shop. The way they communicate. The way they conduct busi-
ness. The way they buy airline tickets and get driving directions. The
Internet promises freedom from many of the delays and limitations of
the physical world. But in doing so, could the Internet also distance
people from the rules and moral conceptions that bind them in the
“real world”?
Copyright © 2001 by Albert Z. Kovacs.
1. (Columbia Pictures 2000).
2. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN 165 (R.J. Hollingdale trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1986) (1886) (second emphasis added).
3. (King James).
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Because in cyberspace people can exist independent of their
names, identities, faces, and personalities, they often transcend the
real world’s moral and legal boundaries. Although the Internet allows
them to transcend or violate these boundaries more easily, it gener-
ally has not changed moral and ethical concepts—notions of what it
means to “do wrong.” However, these notions are under attack. The
ease with which content on the Internet can be (often erroneously)
categorized as mere “information” threatens to erode legal concep-
tions of intellectual property protection and our ethical definition of
theft.
Using Michel Foucault’s historical analysis of punishment and
the development of disciplinary surveillance, I argue that the “spirit
of sharing” that has developed on the Internet is effectively a revolt
against the “prison” erected by copyright law. To assert their proprie-
tary rights effectively, successfully, and with both legal and moral
authority, the recording industry (and other content-based industries)
must break that “spirit of sharing” by making a visible display of
power in cyberspace. By publicly “torturing” Napster4 and similar
4. Napster is a web-based service that allows its users to exchange digital music files over
the Internet. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001):
Napster facilitates the transmission of MP3 files between and among its users.
Through a process commonly called “peer-to-peer” file sharing, Napster allows its us-
ers to: (1) make MP3 music files stored on individual computer hard drives available
for copying by other Napster users; (2) search for MP3 music files stored on other us-
ers’ computers; and (3) transfer exact copies of the contents of other users’ MP3 files
from one computer to another via the Internet. These functions are made possible by
Napster’s MusicShare software, available free of charge from Napster’s Internet site,
and Napster’s network servers and server-side software. Napster provides technical
support for the indexing and searching of MP3 files, as well as for its other functions,
including a “chat room,” where users can meet to discuss music, and a directory
where participating artists can provide information about their music.
The complaint against Napster alleged that the service contributorily and vicariously infringed
the plaintiff music companies’ copyrights in their music recordings, many of which were trans-
ferred between and among Napster users. Id. On July 26, 2000, the district court granted the
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction that would prevent Napster “‘from engaging in, or
facilitating others in copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs’
copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings, protected by either federal or state
law, without express permission of the rights owner.’” Id. (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Nap-
ster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2000)). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed in part and reversed in part, but generally recognized “that a preliminary injunction
against Napster’s participation in copyright infringement is not only warranted but required.”
Id. at 1027. After the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Napster still was enjoined from allowing its users
to transfer copyrighted materials if Napster had knowledge that those materials were legally
protected. Id. Both the Recording Industry Association of America and Napster websites con-
tain the legal documents associated with the Napster lawsuit. See riaa/news: Current Issues, Re-
cording Industry Association of America, at http://www.riaa.org/napster_legal.cfm (last visited
Sept. 5, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Legal Documents, Napster, at http://www.
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file-exchange services,5 the content industries6 are taking a first step
toward quelling the virtual rebellion against copyright.7
I.  THE PROBLEMATIC MORALITY OF THE INTERNET
Through its decentralized architecture, which promises free
communication, the Internet has modified concepts of property and
information, seducing an entire generation into associating copyright
infringement and theft of intellectual property with “discourse” and
“sharing.”
A. The Original Structure of the Internet
The Internet was designed as a communications system that
could survive a nuclear war; communication on the network depends
not on any single path of information flow or central server, but on a
“distributed” architecture that can circumvent system failures or
blockages.8 An oft-quoted comment by Electronic Frontier Founda-
tion9 cofounder John Gilmore sums up the original, and to some ex-
napster.com/pressroom/legal.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Jour-
nal); see also infra note 94 and accompanying text (describing more recent developments in the
lawsuit and Napster’s reaction to the revised preliminary injunction).
5. For example, services like Kazaa, Grokster, and MusicCity allow users to scour other
Internet users’ hard drives for copyrighted songs, music, movies, photographs, and software free
of charge. Jefferson Graham, Napster Proteges Under Fire from Entertainment Industry, USA
TODAY, Oct. 4, 2001, at 3D.
6. While the Napster lawsuit is known primarily for its implications for the music record-
ing industry, the concept of “file sharing” poses a threat beyond the music industry. By the term
“content industries,” I intend to refer not only to the music industry, but also to other media
companies, such as motion picture and television production companies, as well as to those that
produce and distribute computer software.
7. The reader should be aware that this Note takes as a starting presumption that our ex-
isting system of copyright laws is valid and justifiable. This is not to be construed as an en-
dorsement of all forms of intellectual property protection, but merely as a foundational assump-
tion for my argument. I leave the criticism and deconstruction of copyright to cyber-libertarians
and open-source advocates.
8. James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Cen-
sors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 179 (1997).
9. See id. at 178. The Electronic Frontier Foundation describes itself as “a donor-
supported membership organization working to protect our fundamental rights regardless of
technology; to educate the press, policymakers and the general public about civil liberties issues
related to technology; and to act as a defender of those liberties.” Electronic Frontier Founda-
tion, About EFF: General Information About the Electronic Frontier Foundation, at http://www.
eff.org/abouteff.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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tent current, popular conception of the Internet: “The Net interprets
censorship as damage and routes around it.”10
The Internet’s capacity to circumvent obstacles to data flow has
created a new means of communication that seems to eliminate the
possibility of censorship or centralized authoritarian monitoring, con-
trol, or supervision. This unsupervised realm promises to be a para-
dise island for those who yearn for a truly free and seemingly infinite
exchange of ideas, restricted neither by physical location nor by social
or political convention or stigmatization. “In the utopian vision, a
worldwide digital network transcends national borders and promotes
open dialogue, cooperation, and self-regulation. It is a vision of free
and robust scientific, artistic, educational, and political interaction. It
is a model of ‘any-to-any,’ a two-way street where all recipients are
also producers of information.”11
This “utopian vision” of discourse on the Internet seems to real-
ize what long has been a political ideal:12 the free exchange of ideas
from one person to another, without interference from the state. In
the “real world” (at least in the “real” United States), the Constitu-
tion limits with words the power of the government to control the in-
tellectual interaction of the citizenry.13 In the virtual world, freedom
from state supervision and intervention14 promises that ideal intellec-
tual exchange can be completely realized. The Internet can transform
“politics by making true dialogue and free debate available to every-
one,”15 allowing its users the freedom to disseminate their thoughts
10. Boyle, supra note 8, at 178. Although the exact phrasing of Gilmore’s comment is un-
certain, his meaning is not. See id. at 178 n.3 (noting the uncertainty regarding the exact quota-
tion and that even Gilmore himself cannot remember exactly where he originally made the
statement).
11. Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & COM. 509, 513
(1996).
12. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 19–67 (Currin V. Shields ed., Macmillan Publ’g
Co. 1956) (1859) (presenting four arguments to establish “the necessity to the mental well-being
of mankind [on which all their other well-being depends] of freedom of opinion, and freedom of
the expression of opinion”).
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press . . . .”).
14. See, e.g., Expert Report of Professor Lawrence Lessig Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(a)(2)(B), at ¶ 27, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d. 896 (N.D.
Cal. 2000) (No. 99-5183) [hereinafter Lessig] (“States that previously controlled the access by
their citizens to certain political or cultural speech found it hard to effect that control after the
deployment of the Internet. . . . The consequence was an expansion of free speech internation-
ally.”), available at http://dl.napster.com/lessig.pdf (June 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Jour-
nal).
15. Radin, supra note 11, at 513.
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and to access the thoughts of others, with peer criticism and commen-
tary the only possible forms of censorship. The anonymity and meta-
physicality16 of the Internet promises to free its users from the bur-
dens of both their location in the physical world and the
socioeconomic strata that define it. By shedding names, bodies, and
faces—and thus to a large degree their real-world identities—people
can interact (and be judged) in a realm of ideas as ideas themselves.
B. Digital Anonymity and Moral Independence
The anonymity and freedom from physical restriction that the
Internet provides generally has not changed our value systems or
ethical mores. However, in the area of copyright and intellectual
property, they encourage a systematic mutation of our concepts of
property and “sharing.”
The structure and design of the Internet promise the develop-
ment of a freer and more expansive exchange of knowledge and an
explosive increase in political and cross-cultural discourse. In that
sense, the anonymity and metaphysicality of the system allow people
to escape the restrictions of the real world that would inhibit commu-
nication. But the very features of the Internet that hold its greatest
promise also permit users of the system to shed some of the benefi-
cially restrictive norms, laws, and moral structures that govern be-
havior in the real world.
When one enters cyberspace, one can abandon almost all things
“real” about one’s self; name, face, gender, age, nationality, and re-
ligion all can be erased, hidden, or changed. The inhibitions and re-
strictions that accompany one’s place and identity in the real world
can vanish in the virtual one. In a realm of imagination and ideas, the
very notion of reality falls away. What would be impossible or im-
practicable in the real world—for example, a face-to-face, real-time
conversation among students located at different corners of the
globe—becomes possible and even commonplace on the Internet.
Similarly, activities and behavior that are rendered impossible or im-
practicable by law, moral edict, or social pressure become possible
once the contextual reality that gives those commands their authorita-
16. The term “metaphysicality,” as used in this Note, refers to a state of being beyond the
physical plane. In the context of the current discussion of the Internet, it refers to that cyberspa-
tial quality that allows people to exist in a realm beyond the physical or “real” world, a realm
where people exist merely as minds, characters, and ideas, absent the restrictions and limitations
of being located in physical space.
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tive force fades away. In the real world, one’s conduct is governed
largely by one’s location in space, which creates physical limitations
on behavior and helps to determine applicable law, and cultural con-
text, which defines social behavioral expectations and norms. The vir-
tual world for many seems different from the real world in a moral
sense, and that difference has varying degrees of impact.
In a statement regarding the protection of intellectual property
on the Internet, United States Attorney General Janet Reno re-
counted the following anecdote:
A man once told me, a man well-versed [in computer crimes]: “You
know, my 13-year-old daughter knows that she can’t open other
people’s physical mail and read it. She doesn’t go into her sister’s
bedroom when the door is closed. She doesn’t rumble through her
drawers without permission. But she doesn’t know how to act on
line. She doesn’t know what to do with other people’s email.”17
This is one of the more harmless examples of the moral confusion
that results from the physical “depersonalization” of the Internet. It
shows that the simple personal courtesies extended to others, and the
privacy boundaries almost instinctively respected can be confused,
neglected, or simply ignored on the Internet. It is easier—and thus
more tempting—to snoop in cyberspace because it is easier to avoid
detection.
The moral dilemma that results from the libertarian structure of
much of the Internet stems from what can be seen as the dual citizen-
ship of the “netizen.” When one inhabits cyberspace, one is still
physically present in the real world, but one also exists on another
metaphysical plane. The Internet provides a vehicle by which people
can escape the restrictions of the real world without having to sacri-
fice the security and benefits it holds for them. In this sense, one can
view the Internet as a fantasy world or escape from reality, where one
can harmlessly transcend moral restrictions without paying any “real”
penalty. Professor Lawrence Lessig describes an example of such an
escapist, a college student named Jake who published stories on a
USENET18 group called alt.sex.stories: “Jake was a character in his
17. Janet Reno, Statement at the Symposium of the Americas: Protecting Intellectual
Property in the Digital Age (Sept. 12, 2000), available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/
ipsymposium.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
18. USENET is an electronic bulletin-board system accessible via the Internet and other
online services, which contains more than 14,000 forums, called “newsgroups,” each of which
relates to a particular area of interest. USENET—Webopedia Definition and Links, Webopedia,
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own stories, yet who he was in his stories was quite different from
who he was in ‘real’ life. . . . Jake wrote stories about violence—about
sex as well, but mainly about violence. They seethed with hatred, es-
pecially of women.”19
In Jake’s stories, he could display his own brand of despicable
“bravery” and become a hero to those who admired his work. These
were expressive possibilities and outlets that Jake never would have
had save for the Internet. He may have been able to publish his work
in the real world, but his audience would have been much smaller and
the rewards less significant.20 In the real world, Jake was unable, or
simply unwilling, to express the depravity that lurked within his
imagination. But on the Internet, his depravity found an outlet and
more—an eager, (blood)thirsty audience more than willing to receive,
applaud, and demand more of the same. In the real world, Jake was
someone bound by morals, norms, and social convention. “On the
Net he was someone else.”21
The previous examples represent two possible manifestations of
the Internet’s unrestricted nature: first, a simple transgression of
common courtesy, and second, a slicing expression of socially unwel-
come fantasy. While each of these may be morally troubling to some,
they pose little threat of harm to the real world.22 What is most trou-
at http://webopedia.internet.com/TERM/U/USENET.html (last visited June 7, 2001) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
19. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 14–15 (1999). Criminal
charges brought against Jake were later dismissed on First Amendment grounds. See United
States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375, 1390 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
20. “Jake had discovered a way to mainline his depravity into the veins of a public for
whom this stuff was otherwise quite difficult to find. (Even Hustler wouldn’t publish the likes of
this.)” LESSIG, supra note 19, at 16.
21. Id. at 17.
22. Some may balk at my classification of the first example—reading another person’s
e-mail—as “relatively harmless.” However, that activity is, in my opinion, the sort of impolite
conduct that can be corrected without resort to complicated moral logic. It does not take a diffi-
cult mental leap to analogize e-mail to its physical predecessor, and thus the young person who
capriciously violates another’s postal privacy can be reminded relatively easily that she is en-
gaging in the digital equivalent of envelope-steaming. I also classify Jake’s stories as “relatively
harmless” because they generally represent fantasy. They may be horrible, wicked, and vicious,
but they are fantasies—creations of the imagination. In that sense, they may actually prevent the
real-world manifestation of the horrors they contain. But see Amy Lynne Bomse, Note, The
Dependence of Cyberspace, 50 DUKE L.J. 1717, 1748–49 (2001) (concluding that “[t]he Internet
does not exist apart from the world in which it was created and in which its users . . . reside” and
suggesting that “[w]hile one can sympathize with and even share in a fantasy of escape, via cy-
berspace travel, from the tediously fractious and difficult human condition, this fantasy is not a
useful premise on which to base public policy”). One might analogize this type of expression to
the works of the Marquis de Sade, which can be viewed as having been created at least in part as
KOVACS.DOC 01/16/02 9:21 AM
760 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:753
bling is when the freedom and libertarianism of the Internet threatens
the moral and legal constructs of the real world, permitting people to
cultivate their repressed desires and instincts by facilitating acts in cy-
berspace that would be illegal and far less practicable in the real
world.
Perhaps the clearest and most disturbing example of this phe-
nomenon is that of a pedophile soliciting minors online. In many in-
stances, adults have solicited children (or law enforcement officers
posing as children) for explicit sexual conversations online, and have
attempted to make real-world contact with them, either by arranging
meetings for actual sexual intercourse or by exchanging photographs
or other media involving sexual activities.23 “Surreptitious and
anonymous predators can disguise their identities and prey on young
people or others who [sic] they simply trust when they meet them on-
line.”24 As Professor Lessig points out, the anonymity of the Internet,
coupled with its severance from the physical world, allows this type of
criminal to be more effective than he could be in the real world:
“Without this technology, it would be relatively hard for the same
adults to engage in such conversations with kids (thirty-five year old
men roaming playgrounds are usually easily noticed); with the tech-
nology, this criminal activity is increased.”25 The anonymity and
metaphysicality of the Internet again produce an escape from some of
the limitations of real-world morality and its normative structures.
But even this example of the Internet’s facilitation of moral failure
does not represent a change in society’s moral and ethical systems.
rebellious drama meant to shock the conscience of the general public, allowing the reader to
escape, momentarily and relatively harmlessly, the often mundane existence of the real world.
For an example of DeSade’s work, see generally MARQUIS DE SADE, THE 120 DAYS OF
SODOM AND OTHER WRITINGS (Richard Seaver ed., 1987) (1785). Surely a coward such as
Jake, who would not even dare in the real world to express publicly the violent hatred festering
in his mind, would not (with rare exception) dare an actual enactment of such sexual violence.
For a more generalized explication of sexuality, excess, literature and their roles in the religious
transcendence of everyday existence, see generally GEORGES BATAILLE, EROTISM: DEATH
AND SENSUALITY (Mary Dalwood trans., City Lights Books 1986) (1957).
23. For two examples, see United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639–40 (6th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1737 (2001) (describing an online predator who had used the alias
“Stealth725” to contact minor girls for sexually explicit conversation, and who had attempted to
arrange meetings with the girls he had met online); United States v. Crow, 164 F.3d 229, 231–32
(5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1160 (1999) (describing a man who, using the online alias
“VideoDom,” repeatedly contacted an undercover agent [posing as a thirteen-year-old girl],
offering her money to send him videos of herself engaged in explicit sex acts).
24. Reno, supra note 17.
25. Lessig, supra note 14, ¶ 27.
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Although the Internet might facilitate the occasional invasion of
personal privacy (the child’s reading someone else’s e-mail), encour-
age the production of deviant fantasies in the mind of a repressed lib-
ertine (Jake’s telling violent sex stories), or perhaps make it easier for
certain particularly vile criminals to approach their victims (the sex
offender’s stalking children), can the Internet be blamed for any ac-
tual degradation of real-world moral norms? The architecture of the
Internet might facilitate these transgressions, but can that architecture
really carry the blame for the moral attitudes of its users? In the
above examples, the answer is no.
The young girl reading her sister’s e-mail is probably doing
nothing more than she would do had she a similar opportunity in the
real world—namely invading the privacy of another when the chance
of detection is slight. The Internet just makes it easier for her to avoid
the consequences of her moral choice. The sexually and socially un-
derdeveloped author who shares his demented fantasies with like-
minded individuals is doing no more than digitizing the ideas that
would occupy his mind regardless; the Internet merely provides the
vent through which that repressed energy can dissipate. And many
child molesters will seek out victims with or without a computer. The
Internet might make it slightly easier for the perpetrator to escape de-
tection, but the decision to violate society’s sexual taboos is made
long before he enters any Internet chat room.
It would then seem that the Internet, while facilitating moral
transgressions, has done nothing to affect the moral values and ethical
systems people transgress. To put it simply, although the Internet may
in some instances make it easier to “be bad,” it has not changed what
it means to “be bad.” If the architecture of the Internet is not respon-
sible for the moral values that lead to virtual transgressions, then it is
unlikely that changing that architecture will have any real reforma-
tory effect. But there is one area in which the architecture and struc-
ture of the Internet appear to be degrading the legal, moral, and nor-
mative constructs of the real world—namely the theft of intellectual
property.
The supposedly uncontrolled (and at least formerly uncontrolla-
ble) nature of the Internet produces a free flow of information, an ex-
change of ideas with perhaps only infinitesimal recognition of the re-
strictions and limitations of the real world. This unrestricted flow of
information results in a mutation and misunderstanding of property
rights and has seduced a generation into equating stealing with
“sharing.” The architecture of the Internet appears to be largely, if
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not entirely, responsible for the moral values that have spawned the
virtual spirit of sharing. Thus, a change in that architecture not only
might control actual transgressions, but also might reform the con-
fused ethical constructs that are responsible for them.
C. Intangibility, the Myth of Free Information, and the Free-For-All
Ethic of Cyberspace
The Internet’s architecture allows users to exist in a digital plane
where information and other data travel with few restrictions. This
architecture tempts users to identify all content as “information” once
it is separated from a physical storage or transfer medium. It is this
alluring misconception that distorts legal concepts of property and
ethical prohibitions against theft.
Intellectual property law cannot be patched, retrofitted, or ex-
panded to contain the gasses of digitized expression any more than
real estate law might be revised to cover the allocation of broad-
casting spectrum. . . . Digital technology is detaching information
from the physical plane, where property law of all sorts has always
found definition.26
In his article Selling Wine Without Bottles, John Perry Barlow de-
scribes his vision for the future of copyrighted materials in the Infor-
mation Age. He adopts the widely known maxim of writer Stuart
Brand that “[i]nformation wants to be free.”27 Barlow thus directly
rejects the notion of information as a thing, especially on the Internet,
where information is freed from its containers—the pages, books,
tapes, film, and compact discs in which it formerly resided. When in-
formation ceases to be attached to any tangible medium, it becomes
free to flow naturally as an “activity,” a “life form,” and a “relation-
ship.”28 Barlow suggests that current business models in the music in-
dustry fail to recognize the true nature of information on the Internet,
and that copyright as it is currently known will not be able to adapt to
26. John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of Mind on the Global
Net, at http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/John_Perry_Barlow/HTML/idea_economy_article.
html (last visited Sept. 5, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
27. Id.
28. Id.
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the new “dematerialized information economy,”29 in which there is no
“final cut,” and works remain “liquid” without being “fixed by a point
of publication.”30
Professor Margaret Jane Radin also comments on the increas-
ingly fluid nature of formerly “fixed” works. In her view, copyright
protection “perpetuates the notion that property attaches to ob-
jects. . . . ‘Objects’ in cyberspace, however—collections of bits that are
apprehended as works—are ceasing to be fixed and tangible. They
are becoming moving, dynamic, and malleable. . . . Works and the
medium that embodies them are ceasing to be objects, and becoming
processes.”31 These commentaries suggest that information is liber-
ated—made free—by its removal from any kind of tangible or physi-
cal medium. Barlow’s conception of information naturally engulfs the
realm of copyrighted music: “No longer will we mistake music for a
noun, as its containers have tempted us to do for a century. We will
realize once more that music is a verb, a relationship, a constantly
evolving life form.”32
Barlow’s analysis of information and its dissemination on the
Internet appears at first glance to be a fair one. If one understands
“information” to mean ideas, concepts, and facts, and “free” to mean
open and available to a wide audience, then it would seem obvious
that “[i]nformation wants to be free.”33 Once an idea is made accessi-
ble on the web, it is generally available to all who can find it, and it
will more than likely be shared, lauded, criticized, manipulated, ed-
ited, revised, and ultimately adopted, incorporated, or rejected.
The expansive view of free information that Barlow suggests
contains two fundamental errors. First, it seems to define “informa-
tion” so broadly as to include all data that has been or can be digit-
ized and made accessible on the Internet. Second, it understands
“free” in a way that suggests that all information should not only be
widely accessible, but accessible to everyone at no cost whatsoever.
By labeling all content on the Internet “information,” Barlow
would seem to allow the inhabitants of cyberspace to lay claim to all
29. John Perry Barlow, Napster.com and the Death of the Music Industry, at http://www.
technocrat.net/958163435/index_html (last visited Sept. 5, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (emphasis added).
30. Barlow, supra note 26.
31. Radin, supra note 11, at 512.
32. Barlow, supra note 29.
33. Barlow, supra note 26.
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materials available online, regardless of whether they enjoyed a tradi-
tionally protected status in the real world. This type of logic essen-
tially would require that any data made available on the Internet be
relegated to the public domain. In Barlow’s vision, copyright used to
make at least some sense because musical “information” was stored
in tangible media that had to be transferred or copied physically.34 But
now that quality reproductions can be made at almost no cost and can
be transferred without the exchange of any physical object, he seems
to argue, copyright protection and intellectual property rights should
fall away as an outdated and unwelcome reminder of a pre-digital,
primitive understanding of property.35 Ideas, facts, concepts, and
theories formerly could be distinguished as unprotectable “informa-
tion,” as opposed to the protected “property-things” of copyright.
Under Barlow’s system, the Internet removes that copyrighted con-
tent from the physical world (apparently ignoring the fact that the
content simply has moved to computer hard drives from vinyl records
or compact discs) and permits a blurring of the line between, on the
one hand, the ideas and “information” that all rightfully share and, on
the other hand, the creative expression that is deserving of respect,
protection, and reward.
Ambiguity as to what counts as “information” is compounded by
ambiguity as to what kind of “freedom” the information (apparently)
demands and the Internet (apparently) promises. In an online article,
Nicholas Petreley, a self-avowed “open source, free software, and free
speech advocate,”36 comments: “Take this mantra: ‘Information wants
to be free.’ Horsehockey. Information doesn’t want anything. People
want information to be free. But face it: people want corned beef
sandwiches on rye to be free, too. That doesn’t mean we are entitled
to them.”37 There is a difference between stating that all information
(whatever that might be) wants to be free and stating that all informa-
tion should be available free of charge. What file-“sharing” and free-
source advocates should not do “is license or buy existing information
34. See id. (“Copyright worked well because, Gutenberg notwithstanding, it was hard to
make a book.”).
35. See id. (“The riddle is this: if our property can be infinitely reproduced and instantane-
ously distributed all over the planet without cost, without our knowledge, without its even leav-
ing our possession, how can we protect it?”).
36. Nicholas Petreley, Napster and DeCSS: Is It About Free Speech or Free Stuff?, at http://
www.linuxworld.com/lw-2000-09/lw-09-penguin_1.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2000) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal).
37. Id.
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that is not free and then cut it loose without permission. That’s just
plain wrong, and people who do it are demonstrating that what they
are interested in is . . . getting stuff without having to pay for it.”38
These two fundamental misunderstandings—the expansive rede-
finitions of the words “information” and “free”—are causing a shift in
moral expectations and claims of entitlement with respect to formerly
protected materials. Perhaps a clearer translation of “information
wants to be free” is “ideas should not be property.” This formulation
is perhaps less catchy, but it is conceptually neater and less subject to
popular manipulation and misunderstanding. It also expresses noth-
ing new, at least with respect to copyright protection.39 The more ex-
pansive and more popular articulation of this sentiment, however, re-
sults in the development of three new “truths,” which, if left
uncorrected, could easily become moral axioms of the digital world (if
they have not been established as such already).
First, digitalization becomes equated with liberation. Anything
that one might copy onto a hard drive or post to an Internet server
becomes classified as “information,” regardless of whether that label
would have been appropriate when the material was in its real-world,
or tangible, form. Second, availability is identified with entitlement,
meaning that if it is technologically possible for one to access some-
thing in a digital form (or to make it available in such a form), one has
a right to do so, since that is merely the natural realization of informa-
tion’s true state of being. Third, stealing becomes known as “sharing.”
If information is truly free, then it belongs to no one. No matter how
one obtains information, it is rightfully in one’s possession and, in
turn, one is free to share it with anyone. Any restriction of that free-
dom to “share” could then be construed as a restriction of the indi-
vidual’s right to “interact” and “associate” freely with Internet peers.
Some of these new digital “axioms” already have been reflected
in the comments that formerly were exchanged on Napster’s message
38. Id.
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, con-
cept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illus-
trated, or embodied in such work.”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
344–45 (1991) (“The most fundamental axiom of copyright law is that ‘no author may copyright
his ideas or the facts he narrates.’” (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985))); 1 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03[D] (2001)
(“Copyright may be claimed only in the ‘expression’ of a work of authorship and not in its
‘idea.’” (citing Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir.
1986))).
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boards:40 “File sharing advocates and distributors are victims not
thieves. . . . Our choice to exchange whatever information or data . . .
with whom we chose [sic], for no commercial gain, and without re-
strictions [is the] embodiment of our right to freely associate and ex-
change information.”41 That same Napster user also states that the
rights to “freely communicate [and] exchange information are basic
and fundamental,” and that lawsuits such as those brought against
Napster42 “are designed to effectively eliminate and restrict file shar-
ing technology and are designed to restrict and limit the nature and
scope of each individuals [sic] ability to interact with each other and
to participate in an entire category of interaction, communication,
and association.”43
Clearly, these concepts do not translate into the real world. It is
highly unlikely that even the most adamant Napster user would sug-
gest that one should be allowed to enter a record store, make copies
of whatever one chooses, then make those copies available to anyone
who might want them, not only without payment by the recipient, but
also without financial reward to the artist. Even less plausible would
be a defense of that kind of activity that involved a claim of freedom
of association or interaction. Nor would one claim that just because
one has purchased a compact disc, one should be entitled to take an-
other copy from any record store one finds convenient. The physical-
ity of the real world prevents this logic from taking hold. In the above
scenarios, one would be stealing things, objects that are tangible, tac-
tile, visible, and thus value-able. In cyberspace, however, the physi-
cality of things falls away, and the notion of transferring to millions of
anonymous listeners the music one either has purchased or has taken
from somewhere else does not seem so wrong, since no thing is trans-
ferred. Often the only physical act required to effect the transfer is
the simple click of a computer mouse. The digitized content that is
transferred cannot easily be located in the physical world, so it is clas-
40. See Napster Speak Out Forum, Napster, at http://forum.napster.com/index.html (last
visited Sept. 2, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (displaying posted messages from
Napster users). The Napster Forum has been suspended until Napster opens its new member-
ship service. Id.
41. Posting of tericsen, Why Aren’t Record Companies Being Sued?, to Napster Speak Out
Forum, at http://forum.napster.com/ubb/Forum1/HTML/005528.html (posted Oct. 26, 2000) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
42. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
43. Posting of tericsen, Response to Why Aren’t Record Companies Being Sued?, to Nap-
ster Speak Out Forum, at http://forum.napster.com/ubb/Forum1/HTML/005528.html (posted
Oct. 29, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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sified as “information,” which demands to naturally and “freely” flow
from one user to another. Thus, while music pirates exchanging com-
pact discs hardly could claim freedom of association as a defense
(without being greeted by hearty laughter from judges), it seems
more feasible for Internet music pirates to do just that. For if music
(once stripped of its physicality) is merely information, then what is
being stifled by copyright holders is not illicit commerce or thievery,
but discourse.
Although many Napster users adopt this type of libertarian, dis-
cursive philosophy, many others do not feel the need to embrace the
notion that “information wants to be free.” Some members of the file-
sharing community view free music downloads as an entitlement
stemming from previous expenditures by music fans for “overpriced”
recordings. “A lot of people are like, ‘Why should I feel guilty for
downloading MP3s—I’ve seen all their concerts, I own all the CDs,
I’ve bought T-shirts—they’ve got my money already . . . .’”44 “Artists
have been ripping us off for years! . . . We only like one or two [of
their songs, but if] we want to listen to the few, we have to buy them
all. . . . Personally, I feel the artists owe the public alot [sic] of free
downloads!”45
Others see the free exchange of copyrighted materials as an at-
tack on a supposedly corrupt system which degrades music as an art
form by considering its development and promotion as a business:
“[Y]ou guys have RUINED music by turning it into a business and
these ‘artist’ [sic] are not trying to make music they’re trying to make
money. So we are bringing back the soul [sic] reason as to why music
is what it is.”46 Music, once freed from the surface of a tangible me-
dium, apparently regains a lost intrinsic and artistic value: “You lower
your . . . prices and make music less hyped by superficial people like
44. Richard B. Simon, Metallica’s Anti-Napster Crusade Inspires Backlash, at http://www.
sonicnet.com/news/archive/story.jhtml?id=971500 (last visited Oct. 30, 2000) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (quoting Mark Erickson, president and CEO of August Nelson, the online
music company that runs PayLars.com, a “sarcastic site [that] allows fans to ‘donate’ $1 for each
officially released Metallica song, to ‘make up for all the revenue the band thinks it’s losing to
online MP3 trading’”).
45. Posting of heart2heart2000, NOW THE ARTISTS KNOW HOW WE FEEL!, to Nap-
ster Speak Out Forum, at http://forum.napster.com/ubb/Forum1/HTML/005613.html (posted
Oct. 30, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
46. Posting of JBunntLover, You Have Ruined Music, to Napster Speak Out Forum, at
http://forum.napster.com/ubb/Forum1/HTML/004031.html (posted Sept. 28, 2000) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal).
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Brinty [sic] Spears and Back Street boys [sic] and bring back what its
[sic] all about or we are going to do it on our own!”47
The music industry should be alarmed by both the “noble” liber-
tarian Napsterites and their more boisterous and revolutionary cous-
ins (for reasons more significant than poor grammar and bad spell-
ing). From the recording industry’s perspective, Napster users, as well
as the members of other file-sharing communities, regardless of their
underlying ideology, have been seduced into believing that they are
entitled to free music on the Internet. Contrary to the claim that Nap-
ster and its many clones reveal the true meaning and value of music
by removing it from a commercialized context, the Recording Indus-
try Association of America argues that “Napster is devaluing music
itself, teaching an entire generation that music is free and has no
value.”48 The feeling of entitlement is something created and fostered
by the “free”-for-all ethic of the Internet49 and must be addressed
quickly before it becomes engrained as a popular truth. “Once con-
sumers become accustomed to obtaining something for free, they re-
sist paying for it. . . . If the perception of music as a free good becomes
pervasive, it may be difficult to reverse.”50
The lawsuit against Napster51 is but one of several in the past few
years aimed at controlling unauthorized “sharing” of copyrighted ma-
terials.52 Whether one views these suits as attempts by the industry to
47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. Napster Lawsuit Q & A, Recording Industry Association of America, at http://www.
riaa.org/Napster.cfm (last visited Oct. 30, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
[P]erhaps the greatest danger posed by Napster . . . is that consumers are beginning to
consider free music to be an entitlement. This concept, of course, ignores and com-
pletely devalues both the work done by artists to create music and the funds invested
by record companies to bring that music to the consumers.
Brief for A&M Records, Inc., et al. at 14–15, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004
(9th Cir. 2000) (No. 00-16401).
49. See supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text.
50. Brief for A&M Records, Inc., et al., supra note 48, at 14–15.
51. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
52. See Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 345–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(permanently enjoining the defendants from disseminating DeCSS, a computer program that
allows users to circumvent the anticopying technology contained in DVDs, thus making it possi-
ble to make digital copies of DVD content which then could be “shared” on the Internet);
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding
MP3.com liable for copyright infringement for having copied more than 10,000 copyrighted CDs
and making them available to the site’s subscribers without permission); Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No. 00-121, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11670, at *3–*4 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8,
2000) (enjoining iCraveTV.com from transmitting the plaintiffs’ copyrighted television pro-
gramming); see also Complaint at 2–4, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Scour, Inc.
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eliminate peer-to-peer file-sharing technology altogether or merely to
use its legal leverage to take control of that technology, the focus of
the music industry’s counterattack to the ethic surrounding the myth
of free information is the technology itself.53 It is this technological
structure and architecture that has fostered the free-for-all mentality
of the Internet, and it is that same architecture that promises to re-
educate the confused cyberlibertarian while at the same time quieting
the revolt of copyright’s virtual prisoners.
II.  “BUILDING” A SOLUTION: DISCIPLINARY ARCHITECTURE
The philosophy of Michel Foucault provides a historical analysis
of the development of the modern prison system from its origins in
public spectacles of torture. The features Foucault attributes to mod-
ern disciplinary surveillance—automatic, supervisory, invisible—all
can be analogized to the architectural controls which can be estab-
lished on the Internet to control the flow of information as well as to
observe those who access it.
A. Foucault and the Historical Development of Disciplinary
Surveillance
In Discipline and Punish,54 Michel Foucault examines the struc-
tures of disciplinary power and their historical development as a re-
form of public torture.55 Through this reform, power becomes vested
in a web of societal supervision and training rather than in the person
of the sovereign. An inversion occurs in which the sovereign, who
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 00-5385), available at http://www.riaa.com/pdf/scourcomplaint.pdf (last
visited Sept. 5, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (alleging copyright infringement
against Scour, a Napster-like website that allowed users to transfer not only music files, but also
motion pictures). Scour.com soon decided to cease its operations in light of the pending litiga-
tion from the content industries. Clare Saliba, Scour.com to Quit File-Swapping, E-COMMERCE
TIMES, at http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/printer/4842 (Nov. 15, 2000) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
53. See Lessig, supra note 14, ¶ 43 (“Rather than taking steps to protect their own content,
many of these [music] companies have sought to make illegal the technologies that support this
new mode of distribution.”).
54. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
55. In the analysis that follows, I explore Foucault’s historical analysis of visible punish-
ment and disciplinary surveillance in an attempt to show one method for correcting the confu-
sion that has resulted from the ethic of “free information.” No attempt is made to incorporate
into this Note the general tenets or undercurrents of Foucault’s general philosophical project or
to consider more than the most fundamental historical and analytical aspects of Discipline and
Punish. Any indications or representations to the contrary are unintended.
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forged his superior individuality by tormenting the bodies of those
who would dare challenge his status by asserting their own wills, fades
away into obscurity, while the subject of punishment becomes indi-
vidualized as the object of disciplinary surveillance, punishment, and
study.
Early in Discipline and Punish, Foucault shows how the ritualis-
tic display of torture is a response to what could be understood as a
direct attack upon the power of the sovereign. “[B]y breaking the law,
the offender has touched the very person of the prince; and it is the
prince—or at least those to whom he has delegated his force—who
seizes upon the body of the condemned man and displays it marked,
beaten, [and] broken.”56 By transgressing the law, the criminal in this
primitive system dares to raise himself to the level of the prince, de-
claring himself an equal or superior in power by defying the will of
the sovereign. The criminal, through his misdeeds, attempts to indi-
vidualize himself, singling himself out from the herd within the sover-
eign’s power. The sovereign, through a terrible display of physical
strength and political authority, destroys this individuality, reestab-
lishing himself as the solitary figure of independence, freedom, and
power. It is the strong, swift hand of the prince that crushes dissent,
reaffirming his position above the faceless, nameless crowd that
swarms beneath his scepter.
The inversion of this open, visible display of the sovereign’s
power occurs with the abolition of public torture and the rise of
supervisory structures and disciplinary punishment. In this inversion,
the criminal—the object of discipline and training, as well as punish-
ment—is the one who must at all times remain visible. In the former
system, the object of the mechanisms of power could “remain in
the shade . . . . Disciplinary power, on the other hand, [was] exercised
through its invisibility; at the same time it impose[d] on those
whom it subject[ed] a principle of compulsory visibility.”57 In modern
systems of punishment and correction, it is the criminal—the object
of the mechanisms of power—who is individualized, isolated, recog-
nized, and identified—made a visible subject. At the same time,
the machinery of power remains anonymous and invisible, as
the mechanism itself takes control. The principal example of this
system of observational discipline in the real world is the Panopti-
56. FOUCAULT, supra note 54, at 49.
57. Id. at 187.
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con,58 which establishes an almost automatic exercise of anonymous
power. The prisoners are individualized, each in a separate cell, al-
ways in plain view of the central tower, the occupants of which are
hidden from the prisoners’ view.59 This central tower enforces a silent,
automatic rule of discipline, for the prisoners have no idea when they
are being observed, or if they are being observed at all.60 Thus, the
mere possibility of being observed—the potential for the discovery of
misbehavior—imposes upon the prisoner a kind of self-discipline,
where the authority—the faceless remnant of the sovereign—disap-
pears further into the machinery of power. The theoretical result is a
disciplinary and supervisory system in which power functions auto-
matically, without maintenance and at a low cost.61 The structures of
power Foucault describes—automatic, supervisory, invisible, decen-
tralized—all seem analogous to the architectural codes of the Inter-
net, which can silently and without outward signal control the behav-
ior of the inhabitants of cyberspace.62
The Panopticon also individualizes the criminal by making him
the subject of experimental observation and study: “The Panopticon
is a privileged place for experiments on men, and for analysing with
complete certainty the transformations that may be obtained from
them.”63 Similarly, the “trusted systems” that are (or soon will be) es-
tablished on the Internet could track a wide variety of information
about those who access or manipulate online works.64 The architec-
tural code becomes both an exercise and a form of institutional
power. “[W]e must ask of every exercise of power: Why? . . . ‘Power,’
58. Foucault describes the Panopticon:
[A]t the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this tower is pierced
with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is
divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building . . . . [The
cells] are like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone, per-
fectly individualized and constantly visible. . . . Each individual, in his place, is se-
curely confined to a cell from which he is seen from the front by the supervisor; but
the side walls prevent him from coming into contact with his companions. He is seen,




61. Id. at 201.
62. I do not claim to be the first to recognize the potential application of Foucault’s analy-
sis of disciplinary power structures to Internet governance. See Boyle, supra note 8, at 184–88
(analogizing Foucault’s unorthodox vision of power in terms of surveillance and discipline to the
governing structure of the Internet).
63. FOUCAULT, supra note 54, at 204.
64. See infra notes 74–87 and accompanying text.
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in this account, is just another word for constraints that humans can
do something about. . . . [T]he architecture of cyberspace is power in
this sense; how it is could be different.”65
But how should the architecture be established, and who should
make the important decisions involved in that determination? Who
can claim the right to determine the boundaries of possibility on the
Internet, and how will accountability be maintained? It has been ar-
gued that these questions should be answered through privatized ef-
forts.66 In the case of online music swapping, that would mean that the
music industry should seek to develop systems that would protect its
interests.
From the content industries’ perspective, the promise of a digital
Panopticon should seem like a most wonderful solution to what at
first glance looks like a daunting problem. Upon the anarchical sys-
tem of the Internet, the industry quietly could impose a structure that
would protect its rights, while providing detailed consumer informa-
tion that would allow for targeted market research and advertising.67
Indeed, whoever controls the architectural code of the Internet will
hold the virtual scepter of power in cyberspace.
B. The Rise of the Internet Panopticon
The computer architecture of the various spaces that comprise
the Internet determines the possible spectrum of online con-
duct and behavior.68 The original architecture, as discussed in this
65. LESSIG, supra note 19, at 59 (second emphasis added).
66. See Boyle, supra note 8, at 196–202 (proposing that the government look to “privatized
enforcement and surveillance, cost spreading, and the use of ‘material coercions rather than the
physical existence of a sovereign’” in governing the Internet).
67. In an online article posted on the RIAA website, Thomas Dolby Robertson comments
on possible marketing possibilities once the music industry has fully incorporated digitized dis-
tribution:
What the Web offers labels is a unique opportunity to understand, for the first time,
what really makes the public tick. Who they are, why they buy, what else they do
when we’re not buying CDs. There’s never been a marketing platform like it. Armed
with this information, a label ought to be able to precisely target the correct demo-
graphic for its artist, and cut out the wastage in its marketing budget. No more full
page ads in Rolling Stone, where 90% of the eyeballs will belong to the wrong type of
crowd. No more expensive radio and TV ad campaigns, or mindless flyposting of
walls in major cities.
Thomas Dolby Robertson, The Upside of Music on the Web, Part 2: How Technology and Music
Impact Each Other, Recording Industry Association of America, at http://www.riaa.org/Guest_
Column0301.cfm (Sept. 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
68. See Lessig, supra note 14, ¶ 12 (“[T]he architecture or design of cyberspace regulates
behavior in cyberspace.”).
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Note,69 promised a type of freedom and interaction that seemed im-
possible in the real world. What accompanied that promise of free-
dom was a loss of control and regimentation. “The Internet changed
the balance of protection afforded by law, by enabling behaviors that
weaken the protections of a legal regime.”70 While this weakening of
governmental influence was apparent on many fronts,71 Professor
Lessig suggests that the greatest threat lay in the area of copyright
protection.72 The original architecture of the Internet permitted per-
fect digital copying at negligible (if any) cost and permitted equally
costless distribution.73 Lessig argues that while the early architecture
of the Internet posed a threat to copyright protection, developments
in code have the potential to create an era of almost perfect copyright
protection on the Internet—a level of protection that could surpass
anything possible in the real world.74
[C]yberspace does not guarantee its own freedom but instead carries
an extraordinary potential for control. . . . Too many believe liberty
will take care of itself. Too many miss how different architectures
embed different values, and that only by selecting these different ar-
chitectures—these different codes—can we establish and promote
our values. . . . Architecture is a kind of law: it determines what peo-
ple can and cannot do.75
The idea of using a coded system to protect legal copyrights by
making it technically difficult to infringe upon them is not unique to
the Internet. A less perfect system of architectural copyright protec-
tion was established in response to what was considered by many to
be a similar, real-world threat to copyright—Digital Audio Tape
(DAT). The eventual response to the threat of a machine that could
69. See supra Part I.A.
70. Lessig, supra note 14, ¶ 28.
71. See id. ¶¶ 27–28 (commenting on the consequences of the Internet for “control of
speech, the protection of privacy, the defense of copyright, the protection against fraud, or the
protection of children”).
72. Id. ¶ 33 (“Many have argued that no threat to legal protection on the Internet is greater
than the threat the Internet presents for copyright. For the same reason that cyberspace
strengthens free speech, it simultaneously renders the protection of copyrighted material par-
ticularly vulnerable.”).
73. Id. ¶ 34.
74. Id. ¶ 35 (“Technologies are being developed that can radically increase the protection
and control that copyright holders have over their copyrighted material. These technologies
will . . . make it possible for copyright holders to exercise more control over the use of copy-
righted material than they could in real space.”).
75. LESSIG, supra note 19, at 58–59.
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produce perfect, digital copies of compact discs was a change in the
architecture of that machine itself.76 The technology was changed to
degrade deliberately the quality of each successive recording, thus
wiring into the machine a protection against infinite, perfect copy-
ing.77 The previous technology’s physical limitations were pro-
grammed into the new technology to maintain the previous level of
protection. On the Internet, however, developments in code would
permit copyright holders not only to maintain the level of protection
against impermissible copying and distribution that exists in the real
world, but also actually to surpass it.78
Lessig refers to these developments in code as “trusted sys-
tems.”79 With these systems, copyright holders could use software to
perfect control over their works, without resort to legal action, gov-
ernmental intervention, or social normative reform. “Trusted sys-
tems” could control when and how a copyrighted work is accessed,
manipulated, edited, and transferred.80 “The technology, in other
words, would give the copyright holder a kind of power over the user
of copyrighted material that the copyright holder has never before
had.”81
Copyright orders others to respect the rights of the copyright holder
before using his property. Trusted systems give access only if rights
are respected in the first place. The controls needed to regulate this
access are built into the systems, and no users (except hackers) have
a choice about whether to obey these controls. The code displaces
law by codifying the rules, making them more efficient than they
were just as rules.82
Thus, the architecture of the Internet, which originally had suggested
that copyright protection would be profoundly difficult or impossible
in the digital realm, could be modified to create a space of almost per-
fect copyright protection, where users would have even less power to
access, manipulate, and duplicate works than they have in the real
76. Id. at 127–28; Boyle, supra note 8, at 204.
77. LESSIG, supra note 19, at 127–28; Boyle, supra note 8, at 204.
78. See infra notes 79–87 and accompanying text.
79. LESSIG, supra note 19, at 127–30; Lessig, supra note 14, ¶ 36.
80. Lessig, supra note 14, ¶ 36 (citing Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Sys-
tems and Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 137 (1997)).
81. Id.
82. LESSIG, supra note 19, at 130.
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world. Technologies like Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI)83 and
digital watermarks84 offer copyright holders the potential to restrict
copying of protected materials and to track the uses of those copies
that are permitted.85 These new technologies also might be used to
track information about how their protected works are used and who
is using them. “Documents will keep track of how many times they
are read and may complain if they are read too much or by the wrong
person. . . . [These will be] texts that ‘rat’ on you.”86 This information
would be part of a system in which individual (and perhaps individu-
alized) fees could be charged for every infinitesimal use—even those
that would have been considered free or “fair” in the real world.87
Such ultraprotective architectural codes would offer protection
for copyrights unparalleled by any protection available in the real
world. Digital technology, which once promised to be a scalpel, sev-
ering works from the protection of copyright, very soon could coil its
sharp edges into a barbed wire, guarding against anyone who wishes
to gain access. The digital fences that could be, and already have
been, erected could create a virtual Panopticon that would prevent
unauthorized use of protected works and permit the works them-
selves to keep vigilant watch over those with access to them.
83. See Lessig, supra note 14, ¶ 37 (describing the proliferation of “tagging” mechanisms
for copyrighted materials); SDMI, SDMI Frequently Asked Questions, Secure Digital Music Ini-
tiative, at http://www.sdmi.org/faq.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal):
The only content SDMI-compliant devices will not play is illegally copied SDMI mu-
sic . . . . The specification allows consumers to copy (rip) their CDs onto their com-
puters for personal use (on their PC, on their portable devices, on their portable me-
dia, etc.). In fact, the specification enables consumers to do so as many times as they
wish—as long as they have the original disk.
(emphasis added).
84. See Doug Isenberg, Digital Watermarks: New Tools for Copyright Owners and Web-
masters, WebReference.com, at http://www.webreference.com/content/watermarks (last visited
July 30, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal):
Digital Watermarking, sometimes called “fingerprinting,” allows copyright owners to
incorporate into their work identifying information invisible to the human eye. When
combined with new tracking services offered by some of the same companies that
provide the watermarking technology, copyright owners can, in theory, find all illegal
copies of their photos and music on the Internet and take appropriate legal action.
85. See supra notes 80, 83–84, and accompanying text.
86. Boyle, supra note 8, at 201 (citing Pamela Samuelson, Will the Copyright Office Be Ob-
solete in the Twenty-First Century?, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 55, 58 n.18 (1994)).
87. LESSIG, supra note 19, at 135–39.
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III.  A DISPLAY OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE “TORTURE” OF NAPSTER
AS PUBLIC SPECTACLE
To institute a system of digital surveillance and automatic power
on the Internet, the content industries first must make a public dis-
play of that power. Although certainly not the only example,88 the
lawsuit against Napster has provided the music recording industry the
opportunity to make a very public example of what is (or at least was
at the time of the suit’s initiation) the largest of the Internet’s file-
sharing communities.89 To efficiently and legitimately establish a re-
gime of copyright protection on the Internet, the recording industry
effectively must “torture” Napster in full public view, reasserting its
property rights in cyberspace against the rebellious challenge made in
the name of free discourse and “sharing.”
A. The Internet as Prison Riot
Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary power shows that the Panopti-
cal system not only applies to prisons, but also is found in many of the
structures that define who people are and what they become: “The
practice of placing individuals under ‘observation’ is a natural exten-
sion of a justice imbued with disciplinary methods and examination
procedures. . . . Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories,
schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?”90 If the
structures of power have become so pervasive in society that one
cannot escape them—in fact, if one is defined by them—then would
not the Internet be a revolt from that disciplinary system? Is the
Internet not then essentially a prison revolt?
The Internet originally was designed to avoid the restrictions, ob-
servations, and controls that burdened the real world.91 Recall the
manifesto Professor Lessig cites: “We reject: kings, presidents and
88. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
89. See Matt Richtel, With Napster Down, Its Audience Fans Out, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,
2001, at A1 (noting that Napster once claimed over seventy million users, but that the number
of downloads had dropped by as much as ninety-five percent since the service was required by
court order to begin blocking the transfer of copyrighted materials).
90. FOUCAULT, supra note 54, at 227–28; see also Mathieu Deflem, Power/Knowledge, So-
ciety, and Truth: Notes on the Work of Michel Foucault, at http://www.sla.purdue.edu/people/soc/
mdeflem/zfouc.html (Apr. 1999) (on file with the Duke Law Journal):
The “carceral system” becomes complete when cloister, prison, school and regiment
come together. Al[l] these systems are characterized by training, observation, knowl-
edge and perpetual assessment of the soul. . . . [T]he society is the prison.
91. See supra Part I.A.
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voting.”92 The Internet can be viewed as a rebellion against the disci-
plinary surveillance of modern society. The Internet has created a
space in which one can shed the name, identity, and social status
handed down and created by the structures of disciplinary power.
One can abandon the traditional norms and rules of society that are
taught in schools and enforced in prisons. And most importantly, one
can do it anonymously and invisibly. The Internet seems to be the one
place the prying eye of discipline cannot see, or, if it can see, the one
place it cannot see very well.
If the Internet is a rebellion against the disciplinary structures of
the real world, then the rebellion must be crushed to establish “real”
order and stability. In this respect, the last vestiges of the invisible
sovereign must rear up, reveal themselves once again momentarily,
and, in a transitory display of force, establish in this new world the
order of the old system that the Internet subverted. It is the rarest of
prison riots that can be quashed by invisible surveillance. Once the
system of observation has broken down, it takes a show of force to re-
store and stabilize things once again. When the prisoners smash all
the video cameras and take control of the central observation tower,
it may take just the sound of one gunshot and the sight of one dead
inmate to restore the sanity of ordered control. Perhaps it will take
the execution of Napster—arguably the ringleader in the revolt—to
make Internet users realize that in fleeing reality by entering cyber-
space, they have not escaped society’s prison, but have, ironically,
merely encapsulated themselves in a different cell.
B. The Benefits of Public “Torture”
The most significant and immediate benefits of shutting down
Napster and its progeny will be to the content industries, which will
have sealed off an avenue of copyright infringement and media pi-
racy. The exercise of sovereign power extends legitimacy to whatever
surveillance system is established. Also, the visibility of that power
might help disrupt the popularized notion of “free information.”
1. Legitimacy. By “torturing” Napster in public view, the re-
cording industry makes a claim of right or authority to establish the
supervisory system it likely will establish. Instead of merely estab-
92. LESSIG, supra note 19, at 4 (quoting Paulina Borsook, How Anarchy Works, WIRED,
Oct. 1995, at 110 (emphasis added)).
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lishing a system of digital fences, watermarks, or other new copyright-
protective technologies in secret, the music industry also needs to
make an open, unabashed, and honest claim about its rights and
power in cyberspace. If Lessig is right that “the space is sovereign,”93
then a show of individual power must be made to change the space.
Without this open show of power as a claim of legitimate authority,
the imposition of a new architecture—especially one that significantly
restricts the formerly unchecked flow of information—might seem
arbitrary and unjustifiable. By vigorously pursuing its lawsuits against
Napster,94 the music industry can obtain what is in effect the grant of a
legal right to exercise its power in cyberspace. By openly claiming this
right (and displaying it by shutting down Napster’s infringing activi-
ties), the legitimacy of the forthcoming architectural imposition is
preserved against claims that the music industry is acting without
moral or legal authority.
2. Visibility. The spectacle of public violence confronts those
who witness it with a show of power, might, and authority. By estab-
lishing its system, Napster openly and directly has challenged the le-
gitimacy of copyright protection on the Internet (if not everywhere).95
In this sense, it has “touched the very person of the prince,”96 flaunt-
ing any claim of authority that the music industry might have in cy-
berspace. By obtaining a very public condemnation of Napster’s ac-
93. LESSIG, supra note 19, at 198.
94. The recording industry generally has been aggressive in its legal pursuit of Napster, es-
pecially during the summer of 2001, when a district court in California required Napster (which
already had ceased its file-swapping services while it upgraded its servers and other technology)
to remain offline until such time as it could implement software which would block 100 percent
of transfers of copyrighted materials. See Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings In Re Napster
Copyright Litigation, No. MDL-00-1369 MHP (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2001), at 32, available at http://
news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/napster/transcript071101.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2001) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (“It’s not good enough until every effort has been made to, in fact, get
zero tolerance . . . . There should be no copyright infringement, period.”). At the time of the
order, Napster’s software was capable of blocking approximately 99.4% of infringing transfers.
Id. Judge Patel’s order, unfortunately, was reversed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals soon
thereafter. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. 01-16308 (9th Cir., July 18, 2001), available
at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/napster/9thcir71801ord.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2001) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal). The Recording Industry Association of America noted in its
response to the reversal that “the court only temporarily lifted Patel’s order and will hear argu-
ments on the case later this year.” Associated Press, Napster Allowed to Go Back Online,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES, July 19, 2001, at C2.
95. See Brief for A&M Records, Inc. et al., supra note 48, at 2 (quoting an internal Napster
document that admits its users will be “exchanging pirated music”).
96. FOUCAULT, supra note 54, at 49.
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tivities, and by effectively destroying Napster (through a permanent
injunction and a significant damage award), the music industry can
stake its claim to power and right on the Internet. At the same time,
this display of destructive power might awaken or startle those who
witness it (especially Napster users) from the illusion of free informa-
tion. By executing Robin Hood publicly, the sovereign might remind
a few of the merry thieves that stealing is wrong and will be punished,
no matter how praiseworthy the perpetrator or villainous the victim.
But the benefits of the public torture of Napster will not be lim-
ited to the content industries. Despite the “harm” suffered by advo-
cates of free information, there are some latent advantages to Inter-
net users from this type of public display of authority.
First, the visibility of a public spectacle like the Napster lawsuit
ensures that users know who established the disciplinary system un-
der which they live. The music industry must identify itself as a major
impetus for the erection of digital fences and similar impediments to
the flow of information. The industry cannot hide behind claims of
market forces or other invisible hands. Those who will have their
wrists bound with digital cuffs, and who will be tagged and observed
as they navigate cyberspace, will thus be aware of these restrictions.97
When the restrictions are hidden in the architecture of the space it-
self, it is paramount that people be made aware of their existence and
of their contingency, since otherwise they might consider those struc-
tural restrictions to be “just the way things are.”98
Second, this type of a showing of sovereign power establishes a
focus or center from which the disciplinary system can be said to
originate, thus resulting in some accountability for those who estab-
lish it. The visibility of the destructive force of the music industry as
effected upon Napster would identify the music industry as the author
of the disciplinary system that likely would replace current file-
sharing technologies. In this respect, “the way things are” would be
revealed not as the result of anonymous evolution or the unfolding of
inevitable technological fate, but rather as the direct result of an im-
position by an authority. Thus, “the way things are” becomes “the
97. Visibility in this sense also is valuable to the sovereign if the display of power is to have
any deterrent or preventative effect. “The person constrained must know of the constraint. A
law that secretly punishes people for offenses they do not know exist would not be effective in
regulating the behavior it punishes.” LESSIG, supra note 19, at 238.
98. Boyle, supra note 8, at 205 (“The technology appears to be ‘just the way things are’; its
origins are concealed, whether those origins lie in state-sponsored scheme or market-structured
order, and its effects are obscured because it is hard to image the alternative.”).
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way things have been made to be.” If the controls and restrictions be-
come oppressive, unreasonable, impracticable, or unconstitutional,
Internet users will know at whom to direct their accusations.
C. Why Settlement Is No Option
Why has the music industry apparently chosen to eliminate Nap-
ster completely? Why did it not use the leverage of the lawsuit and
impending legal judgment against Napster to force a settlement that
would have allowed the content industries to acquire file-sharing
technologies and utilize them for their own gain?99
Settlement would have tended to discredit the legitimacy of the
music industry’s claim of sovereign right. This air of illegitimacy could
have taken two forms, both of which relate to the adequacy of the in-
dustry’s claims against Napster. Settlement could have weakened the
apparent strength of the music industry’s claims, giving the appear-
ance that Napster’s defenses carried such weight and strength that the
industry had to give in, rather than risk the embarrassment of a legal
defeat. Also, failure to see the lawsuit through to a final judgment
could have left open the important question of whether Napster’s ac-
tivity was definitively illegal or improper. The lack of a final resolu-
tion would have allowed those who believe file sharing to be a pro-
tected right akin to expression or association to persist in that belief.
And those who view free online music to be an entitlement premised
on the music industry’s abuse of its copyrights would have been able
to claim that Napster’s demise was not the result of legal or moral
culpability, but was merely the result of the music industry’s formida-
ble leverage and financial strength. Either way, any subsequent limi-
tations on music downloads imposed by a deal between Napster and
the music companies would have lacked the legitimacy the limitations
will have if Napster is defeated and disabled.
Settlement not only would have legitimized Napster’s defenses, it
also would have made Napster appear in the eyes of some of its more
idealistic supporters to be a traitor to its revolutionary founding prin-
ciples. While settling with Napster would have ingrained even more
deeply the idea that file sharing is a legitimate activity being unfairly
suppressed by an evil and greedy music industry, it also would have
undermined file sharers’ loyalty to the Napster service. Thus, the set-
99. For a discussion of one of the companies which already has settled its lawsuit with Nap-
ster, see infra notes 100–09 and accompanying text.
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tlement agreement would have been self-defeating from a business
perspective as well. Robin Hood would lose the support of his follow-
ers if they learned he had replaced his rebellious ideals and activities
with the title of “tax collector” and a paycheck from the king.
One plaintiff in the Napster lawsuit, Bertelsmann, reached a set-
tlement agreement with the service.100 The response of Napster users
was hardly optimistic or relieved. “Initially, Napster.com depicted it-
self as a challenger to the present system of intellectual copyright,”
one user wrote.101 “It was to be a community . . . of free file sharing;
akin to having several thousand people in your basement sharing and
appreciating a diverse range of music.”102 A settlement or licensing
agreement with record companies merely would make Napster an ex-
tension of the corporate machinery that free information advocates
rebel against. “It appears Napster.com was never about a ‘free’ com-
munity committed to sharing but about putting Napster into ‘play’
with the major record labels. . . . How else does Napster explain the
secretive and relatively unexpected announcement of a ‘partnership’
with BMG? . . . [T]he revolution was always for sale.”103
Napster users easily could have become disenchanted with a
service they viewed as having “sold them out.” If Napster users envi-
sioned themselves as fighting the status quo together with the creators
of the Napster service, they would have felt betrayed if the service se-
cretly stopped the rebellion by hopping into bed with the enemy.104
One user complained that Napster, by “having taken money from a
large record label has sold us out. . . . Your storage space, internet
connection, collection of MP3s has been handed over to a record la-
bel. They now talk of using our resources to sell MP3s to me and you.
. . . WE HAVE BEEN SOLD OUT.”105
100. E.g., Brad Stone, The Odd Couple, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 13, 2000, at 56–57.
101. Posting of HistoryNut, Is the Revolution Dead?, to Napster Speak Out Forum, at http://




104. The close-knit relationship between Napster and Bertelsmann has become even more
intimate. On July 24, 2001, Napster announced that Konrad Hilbers, former executive vice
president and chief administrative officer for Bertelsmann would become chief executive officer
of Napster, Inc. Napster Announces Konrad Hilbers as CEO, Napster, at http://www.napster.
com/pressroom/pr/010724.html (July 24, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
105. Posting of Internet_Warrior, Napster Has Sold Us Out, to Napster Speak Out Forum, at
http://forum.napster.com/ubb/Forum1/HTML/007126.html (Nov. 13, 2000) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
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Settlement also would not have prevented the departure of users
from Napster to another, decentralized file-sharing service like
Gnutella.106 Users who refuse to pay even a nominal fee are being
lured by the cost-free nature of substitute services that offer the same
file-sharing capabilities as Napster. Those who feel betrayed by Nap-
ster’s “selling out” will prefer the even more decentralized (and thus
more rebellious) systems. Within days of the settlement announce-
ment with Bertelsmann, some Napster users began jumping ship.
Fans are turning to alternatives. “We’d been getting a few hundred
new members each day, but that increased to several thousand”
Wednesday [the day after the Bertelsmann agreement was an-
nounced], says Gavin Hall, 20, co-founder of Napster clone Song-
spy.com. Online for a month, Songspy, with 30,000 members, vows
to stick with a policy of free music. “We don’t want to betray our us-
ers like Napster did,” Hall says. “Charging dues is not in the spirit of
sharing.”107
This exodus has continued, especially during Napster’s recent self-
imposed, and temporarily court-mandated, shut-down.108 “Other pro-
grams used to exchange music . . . . have emerged . . . [not only] as us-
ers have become accustomed to obtaining music online but [also] as a
vacuum was created by the demise of Napster . . . .”109
It is clear that merely eliminating Napster will not end the mis-
conception of “free information” and the culture of entitlement that
accompanies it completely.110 Some ardent rebels will seek new
sources of free music, moving away from the servers of Napster to
more elusive, decentralized systems like Gnutella.111 These services
might pose an even greater threat to the content industries than did
Napster, since the newest generation of file-swapping technologies is
106. Professor Lessig comments:
Gnutella is a simple substitute for Napster. It facilitates a better peer-to-peer search-
ing capability, and is operated in a far more decentralized manner. . . . Thus, the exis-
tence of Gnutella means that any regulation of Napster is likely ultimately to be inef-
fective. There is no barrier to limit consumers switching from Napster to Gnutella.
Lessig, supra note 14, ¶¶ 66–67.
107. Jefferson Graham, Napster’s Bertelsmann Alliance Isn’t Music to All Ears, USA
TODAY, Nov. 2, 2000, at 1A.
108. Richtel, supra note 89, at A1.
109. Id. 
110. See, e.g., id. (explaining that many Napster users have switched to other, more decen-
tralized music-sharing programs in the absence of Napster).
111. See id. (noting that the newer decentralized systems are now easier to use and harder to
police).
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easier to use than ever.112 These new technologies are “becoming in-
creasingly more difficult to police, possibly forcing record companies
to sue individual users, a daunting, if not impossible task.”113 It is pos-
sible that the display of power necessarily might extend beyond Nap-
ster and other Internet services to the users of those services them-
selves, perhaps by seeking criminal prosecution of the most egregious
and flamboyant (and perhaps the proudest) advocates of file shar-
ing.114 A prime target for such prosecution would be someone like the
“law office manager in Tampa, Fla., and former Napster user who has
moved to MusicCity.com,” who has said that “he had downloaded
more than 120 full albums in the last year from the Internet, first from
Napster, then from MusicCity, and he said he had not bought a single
album during that time.”115
The music industry cannot hope to counter the true threat to
copyright on the Internet—the “spirit” of “sharing information”—
without a visible and definite display of power, first against services
like Napster, and perhaps later against the individuals who use them.
Without some way to reform the ethic of “free information” and the
sense of entitlement that accompanies it, technological advances
meant to protect copyright in cyberspace will lack legitimacy and will
be resisted perpetually. The music industry need not achieve support
for its position. Internet users need not become ardent supporters of
copyright law. But the “spirit of sharing” must be broken if copyright
is to survive. The wild horse must be broken before it can be trusted
alone in its stable.
CONCLUSION
The metaphysicality of the Internet allows people to shed the
moral limitations and social stigmas that inhibit transgression of social
norms in the real world. In most instances, this merely permits people
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Copyright law provides for criminal prosecution of willful infringement. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 506(a) (1994):
Any person who infringes a copyright willfully either—
(1) for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, or
(2) by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during
any 180-day period, of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more
copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000,
shall be punished as provided under section 2319 of title 18, United States Code.
115. Richtel, supra note 89, at A1 (emphasis added).
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to conduct themselves in the same way they would in the real world
could they avoid detection. However, the formless freedom of the
Internet, as well as its lack of physicality, results in an additional
moral shift with respect to the infringement of copyrighted materials.
The widespread, unauthorized, and free distribution of digital media
on the Internet allows people to take advantage of their virtual invisi-
bility by appropriating music with great ease, minimal (if any) social
stigma, and very little chance of detection. The structure of the Inter-
net also confuses them into thinking that they are entitled to the
things they steal. Free-flowing, non-restrictive “sharing” technologies
like Napster have been developed, effectively cutting the lock to the
candy store door. Unfortunately, the children who have been stealing
candy feel they have a right to complain when the store owner con-
templates buying a new security system.
This situation represents a revolutionary departure from the
moral and legal restrictions of the real world. The proper response
(from the perspective of the music and other content industries) is a
show of sovereign power, which quiets what is in effect a revolt from
the “prison” of ordered, real-world society. By vigorously pursuing its
suits against Napster and other similar file-sharing services, the music
industry can make that show of power.
Through this public display, the music industries can momentar-
ily centralize and visualize the power structures that will guide the fu-
ture of the Internet. This moment will be followed by a quiet retreat
into silent observation, where the centralized power exerted on the
Internet by the content industries can diffuse into an architectural
power incorporated into the very architecture of the Internet, which
will exercise control from within. The moment of visualization is nec-
essary to make the subsequent architectural power structures more
legitimate and effective. By urging the music industry to seek com-
plete victory over Napster, I do not mean to endorse completely the
industry’s claims or the likely results that would follow from their le-
gal success against Napster and other file-sharing services. I intend
merely to suggest that making the display of power over Napster
public and complete will be the most legitimate, efficient, and success-
ful means by which the industry can establish a true system of copy-
right enforcement in cyberspace.
Those who support Napster and the relaxation of copyright laws
to permit music “sharing” on the Internet should not necessarily de-
cry my call for a display of authority. If the music industry takes a
public and visible approach to asserting its claimed property rights, it
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necessarily will make itself accountable for its actions. The music in-
dustry also will expose itself to criticism for the approach it takes and
for the institutional and architectural changes it imposes on the Inter-
net. The music industry will not be able to shirk responsibility for the
imposition of architectural controls that most certainly will come to
encapsulate digitized copyrighted materials. “The way things are” will
not be considered the result of happenstance or an accident of his-
tory, but rather will be the direct consequence of an affirmative, pub-
lic action taken by an identifiable sovereign. The king, before dis-
solving into the secret mechanisms of power, must stand triumphantly
over the broken body of the defeated rebel. But in doing so, he lets
potential assassins know precisely where to take aim.
